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Reference pricing versus co-payment in the pharmaceutical industry   
Abstract 
 
Within a horizontally differentiation model, we analyse the relative effects of reference pricing and 
copayment reimbursement on firms pricing and quality strategies as well as on market coverage 
under different market structures: competitive market, local monopolies and exogenous full market 
coverage. Results allow us to shed some light on the welfare and total drug expenditure implications 
of different drug reimbursement policies. 
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1 Introduction
In this paper we aim at comparing two of the most common drug Þnancing
mechanisms: reference pricing and co-payment trying to clarify the broadly ac-
claimed positive aspects of reference pricing against co-payment systems. Refer-
ence Pricing (RP) is a regulatory mechanism aimed at controlling pharmaceuti-
cal expenditure in terms of their impact on quality, market coverage and prices.
The mechanism consists of clustering drugs according to some equivalence cri-
teria (chemical, pharmacological or therapeutic) and deÞning a reference price
for each cluster. The third party payer, then, will just reimburse not more than
that price for each drug on that cluster. If a consumer buys a drug with price
lower or equal to the reference price of that cluster, then the co-payment he
faces is null. Otherwise, if the drug bought is priced higher than the reference
price, the consumer will pay the dierence between the reference price and the
drug price.
Even though its formulation varies from country to country, RP is gener-
ally seen as an e!cient mechanism in cutting drug prices by encouraging self
restraint, in controlling relative demand of highly priced drugs and in encour-
aging the appropriate use of drugs. Based on this premise, third party payers
pharmaceutical expenditure would be controlled. However, the eectiveness of
this mechanism strongly depends on its ability in enhancing competition in the
drug market and on the promotion of Þnancial responsibility by consumers and
pharmaceutical Þrms.
In our opinion, there are two crucial points concerning RP regulation: its
e!cacy in achieving the goals it aims for, and its discriminatory eects. Con-
cerning the Þrst, it is important to identify the cause of high pharmaceutical
expenditure. Indeed, drug expenditure is driven by two factors: high prices
and high consumption Lopez-Casasnovas and Puig-Junoy [5] state that RP as a
procurement mechanism would indeed be eective if the market fulÞls a speciÞc
structure, namely, a large buyer, wide product coverage and low demand elastic-
ity. If RP ends up reducing prices, it might not end up reducing pharmaceutical
expenditure if drug consumption is very high.
Furthermore, by clustering drugs that might not be perfect substitutes one
can expect that due to patient characteristics RP might lead to undesirable
eects such as discrimination against Þrms and patients1 . If patients select
one of the drugs priced below the RP just to avoid the co-payment, we might
expect a lower level of treatment eectiveness and even an increase in expenses
if, afterwards, the patient needs complementary treatment2 .
1Zammit-Lucia and Dasgupta [9] cite the case of a patient suering dierent averse aects
when using dierent drugs in the same cluster. The patient suered severe averse eects
from one calcium antagonism with one drug but tolerated the other drug classiÞed in the
same cluster.
2This situation is aggravated if one considers that patients are not perfectly informed about
dierent drugs. If this is the case, clustering drugs, and attributing a RP to each cluster,
distorts even further patients perception of the adequacy of a drug relatively to another in
the same cluster, makes the selection of an adequate drug even more di!cult and, therefore,
1
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Weak substitutability between drugs in the same cluster is quite likely to
occur due to a wide range of drugs characteristics: dierences in drug qual-
ity, performance, dierences in chemical preparation, in application form, bio-
availability, number and type of indications, side eects, to name some [6].
These drug speciÞcations can be of higher or lower relevance depending on the
speciÞc patient to whom the drug will be administrated. If, from a speciÞc pa-
tient point of view, there is no interchange-ability then the co-payment becomes
non avoidable and, consequently, RP discriminates against the patient whenever
opting for a drug whose price is higher than the RP level. Therefore, unjustiÞed
inequalities between patients might then arise if RP fails to take into account
patient heterogeneity.
The literature on RP is scarce and not all the subjects addressed above have
been covered. It urges the development of theoretical set ups in order to better
understand incentives of this policy and, even more importantly, to develop
optimal Reference Pricing policies.
The studies by Mestre Ferrandiz and Merino-Castelló deserve special atten-
tion ([8], [7]). The generic paradox arises on the work by Mestre-Ferrandiz [8].
The author compares the impact of a reference price and a co-payment system
in a pharmaceutical market with generic competition. Using a horizontal dif-
ferentiated model where two Þrms compete á la Bertrand, the author concludes
that, just for some RP level, a RP policy can control pharmaceutical expendi-
ture and reduce drug prices. Even though some welfare analysis is developed,
the author doesnt explicitly solve for optimal reference pricing.
Merino-Castello [7], studies the impact of RP on the price setting strategies
of pharmaceutical Þrms (generic and branded) on a vertical product dierenti-
ated model. The author concludes that RP is indeed eective in enhancing price
competition as, after RP had been implemented, branded prices decrease while
generic prices remain constant. Nevertheless, this price competition increases
the usage of branded drugs in detriment of generics.
We believe, however, that, when patients are heterogeneous, the eect of RP
on price competition would be lower because of a market segmentation eect. In
fact, if there exists consumer heterogeneity in terms of price elasticity, drugs that
are not perfectly substitutable will beneÞt from some market power even after
RP has been introduced, and hence Þrms will keep on pricing above the reference
price level. If this is the case, a subset of consumers would not be able to avoid
the co-payment, thus being indeed discriminated by RP. On the contrary, it
might also be the case that due to lack of information part of the demand
ends not buying the drug that better matches his speciÞcations, switching to a
less-than optimal cheaper drug in order to avoid the co-payment. If this is the
case, RP might lead to patients being prescribed drugs not perfectly suitable
for their health condition, leading to a lower health outcome, or, if patients
need complementary treatment, or drugs, even to increases in health care costs.
Clearly, to fully take into account patients heterogeneity, it would be necessary
increases the probability of the need of supplementary treatment. Nevertheless, our model
assumes perfect information and therefore this analysis goes beyond the scope of this analysis.
2
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to consider both horizontal and vertical dierentiation. In fact, our analysis
diers from the two above mentioned contributions in several aspects.
Firstly, in order to capture the eects of both quality and consumers speci-
Þcities on the decision of buying a drug, we complement a model of vertical
dierentiation with an horizontal dimension3 and for consumer heterogeneity
along the horizontal dimension. Thus, while letting each patient have their
best-preferred drug, we assume that patients are homogeneous in what con-
cerns their preferences for quality4 : everything else equal, all the consumers
prefer higher to lower quality drugs. As the inclusion of a two dimensional
dierentiation might be a controversial subject in the pharmaceutical market
modelling, a deeper justiÞcation may be useful before proceeding.
We intend as quality of a pharmaceutical product, all the characteristics af-
fecting its e!cacy. Dierences in quality might arise from dierences in coating,
in the production process (for instance, rates of agitation and pH during the
production process), in the degrees of purity of the active compound, just to
name some. These dierences may aect the e!cacy of a drug, for instance,
by aecting the rate of absorption of the active compound. Despite this homo-
geneity, consumers dier on their most preferred drug, because of consumers
individual speciÞcities. This assumption can be exempliÞed in several ways.
For example, when faced with the choice of two drugs, clustered in the same
group, consumers might be constrained to buy one speciÞc drug due to adverse
side eects that arise when combining the second drug with the already active
medication, or even because of the side eects of the drug when administrated
alone.
Another example is patient intolerance or "neutrality" to a speciÞc active
compound. In fact, dierences in metabolism, existence of concurrent diseases,
gastric pH, bacterial ßora, among others, inßuence the tolerability and e!cacy
of a speciÞc drug.
To provide a general example, two drugs are said to be horizontal dierenti-
ated when, for a speciÞc patient, one has side adverse aects and the other not.
On the other hand, the same drugs are said to be vertically dierentiated if, for
all patients, their e!cacy is dierent due to dierent rates of absorption caused
by drugs characteristics (e.g. dierent coatings). Therefore, two consumers
that dier on their most preferred drug, when deciding between two drugs with
the same active compound (i.e. zero horizontal dierentiation), will base their
choice on the drugs levels of quality. This case is well illustrated when we con-
front generic and branded drugs. As we have claimed before, these drugs might
not have the same quality, or, maybe better, consumers might perceive their
qualities as dierent. On the other hand, if the same consumers have to choose
between drugs with dierent active compounds, their choice will depend on
3Note that we do not solve for drugs locations, we simply assume that drugs are horizontally
dierentiated but that the location of each Þrm having been chosen in a previous stage not
contemplated in our model.
4One can think of it as quality (vertical dierentiation) or perceived quality (virtual dif-
ferentiation). In the remainder of the paper we will always refer to quality (hence vertical
dierentiation) as the results from both set-ups are qualitatively equivalent
3
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the trade o between higher (lower) quality and lower (higher) substitutability
between the drugs.
In the former case, we might expect RP policies to have a discriminatory
eect against Þrms if quality dierences are not accounted for: by reimbursing
the same amount for all the qualities, the government is in fact favouring low
quality Þrms and providing incentives to lower the level of quality produced.
In the latter case, the discriminatory eects are also against consumers if RP
fails to account for patients heterogeneity5 . Consequently, it is important to
distinguish between the two dierentiation dimensions. Even though both have
implications on consumers utility, the source of those eects diers: as concerns
vertical dierentiation, the implications for patients utility are exclusively due
to the drug characteristics, while, concerning horizontal dierentiation, those
eects depend on the consumer speciÞcities. We argue that this is a crucial
point to be taken into account in the design of drugs reimbursement policies.
Moreover, and contrary to the existing literature, we assume patients to have
the same Þnite willingness to pay for quality.
Finally, we also make some considerations on optimal reference pricing poli-
cies. Brekke, Nuscheler and Straume [2] have developed a set up that includes
some of these features. They study, in a model of spatial competition, the eect
of a price regulation mechanism, where the regulator sets the prices, on the qual-
ity and location variables. However, in their model patients are homogeneous
on their tastes and RP is not analysed.
There are several questions that are worthwhile analysing: If patients do
indeed have dierent degrees of substitutability between two drugs, is it optimal
to settle a unique reference price level for those two drugs, independently of
patients degree of substitutability between those same drugs? What are the
eects of such a policy on the quality of the drugs in the market? How does
this aect welfare? Is it e!cient in the control of health expenditure? If yes,
who is paying the cost reduction? To answer these questions, we analyse the
eect of RP on equilibrium outcomes, having as a benchmark a co-payment
system, in a model where drugs are horizontally dierentiated and where Þrms
also decide on optimal quality. Firms choose prices and quality, and patients are
assumed to be heterogeneous, in that each patient has its best-preferred drug.
Within this framework we analyse the impact of co-payment reimbursement and
reference pricing on drugs prices, quality and market coverage under dierent
market structures, namely, competitive market, local monopolies and exogenous
market coverage, highlighting welfare and cost control implications.
5Assuming that patients stil buy their most preferred drug even when its price is higher
than the reference price level. Otherwise, if consumers opt for the cheaper drug to avoid the
copayment, RP is discriminatory towards these consumers as the healing process is slower or,
even worse, these consumers might suer from negative adverse eects.
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2 The model
2.1 A speciÞc model for pharmaceuticals
While the main qualitative results by Economides (1984) [3] clearly still apply
to our model, however, in order to better Þt the very nature of pharmaceuti-
cals markets, we introduce three important innovations which require particular
attention.
First, in our model varieties are treated, unlike Economides [3], as exoge-
nously given. Therefore, our model is clearly unable to provide an equilibrium
location choice comparable with Economides result against the acclaimed "Prin-
ciple of Minimum Dierentiation".
Secondly, and crucially, we introduce a second, vertical, dimension in the
analysis. In fact, Þrms endogenously choose the quality levels at which they
provide the dierentiated drug. This, in turn, directly aects consumers util-
ity, by the new element tusl , and therefore substantially drives patients choice
whether, and, if so, what to buy.
Finally, and most importantly, our main objective is to investigate the above
quality-then-price duopoly game in presence of a reimbursement policy. In fact,
in most of the pharmaceutical markets in Europe patients are partially subsi-
dized by third party payers, such as the national health service or the insurance
companies, according to some speciÞc reimbursement rule.
In particular, two principal health care Þnancing schemes have been largely
adopted with regards to private expenditure on drugs. On the one hand, the
traditional co-payment system reimburses the patients a proportional fraction
of all drugs prices. On the other hand, the more recent reference pricing system
refunds patients a lump sum amount independently of the price of the drugs
actually bought.
We argue, however, that dierent reimbursement policies may have an im-
pact on patients demand, thus aecting Þrms strategies and equilibrium quali-
ties and prices. To better illustrate the role of co-payment and reference pricing
in the quality-then-price duopoly game are considered in the next sections.
2.2 Firms and products
There are two Þrms, each producing a drug at an identical marginal cost f, for
simplicity normalized to zero. Firm 1 produces drug 1 and Firm 2 produces
drug 2. Drugs are horizontally dierentiated à la Hotelling [4], being located
in an unidimensional characteristics space as represented by the unit interval
[0> 1]. In particular, we assume that varieties {{1> {2} 5 [0> 1] have already been
chosen, by Þrm 1 and 2 respectively, as outcomes of a previous decision process,
and that they are therefore treated as exogenously given in our model.6
Varieties can be thought as associated each to a speciÞc composite need for a
speciÞc health treatment. Equivalently, the unit interval [0> 1] can be interpreted
6Locations are assumed to be exogenous since a model with endogenous locations as well
as qualities would be intractable
5
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as a cluster containing all the dierent, but related, drug varieties designed for a
close family of comparable health dysfunctions: for instance, any drug treating
ßue, or gastritis, or throat cancer and so on. On the other hand, drugs are also
vertically dierentiated in that, for each variety, a continuum of possible quality
speciÞcations is possible. Given a speciÞc variety, higher quality drugs are most
eective in treating the relative health disease, and are then preferred by any
patient having that speciÞc horizontal characteristic. Furthermore, each Þrm
select a quality-price strategy in order to maximize its proÞt function, within a
two-stages non-cooperative game.
2.3 Timing
In fact, we assume the timing of the model being as follows. Before the game
starts, a given pair of drug varieties {1> {2 5 [0> 1] has been exogenously selected
by Þrms. By a standard convention, {1  {2.
In the Þrst stage, given drug varieties, each Þrm l = 1> 2 chooses, indepen-
dently and simultaneously, the quality speciÞcation tusl of its own drug {l.
In the second stage, being both varieties and qualities common knowledge,
each Þrm l = 1> 2, again simultaneously and independently, chooses its price sl.
After the two stages of strategic decisions by the Þrms, all the consumers
just choose which preferred drug variety to buy, if any, and all the payos are
consequently worked out.
We believe such a timing can Þt quite well the genuine essence of competition
in drugs markets.
In fact, most of the times, the decision to undertake the production of a spe-
ciÞc drug variety implies long-run investments, both in R&D and in technology,
which are planned and implemented long in advance to the consideration of
a possible market structure. Indeed, long-run scientiÞc progress, technological
advancements, research outcomes and patents are much more likely to represent
explanatory factors for the entry into a drugs line, than strategic considerations
in terms of actions and reactions by potential competitors.
On the other hand, given the long-run decision of locating at a speciÞc drug
variety, medium-run adjustments in the relative qualitative level are certainly
possible. Moreover, such a decision can hardly be thought as being independent
from the consideration of the strategies by competitors already active in the
production of the same drug, or of close varieties.
Finally, in the short-run, given the varieties and the quality levels produced
in the market, each Þrm can compete by setting its price at an optimal level,
given the competitors pricing behaviour.
2.4 Strategies
The actions by each Þrm l = 1> 2 consist of the choice of a quality level tusl 5
Tl =
£
0>T
¤
, in the Þrst stage, and of a price sl 5 Sl = [0> n] in the second stage.
We may deÞne T as the maximum attainable quality, the frontier at the state
6
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of the art, and T = T1 ×T2.7
A strategy for Þrm l = 1> 2 is then represented by a quality-price pair l 5
	l = Tl × STl , where S
T
l : T $ Sl is a correspondence from the space of the
chosen quality levels to some price.
Finally, no explicit strategic behaviour is described for consumers, who just
choose whether to buy or not, and if so, which drug to buy, taking as given
varieties, qualities and prices set by Þrms.
2.5 Equilibrium Solution
The model being a game of perfect information with sequential stages of simul-
taneous moves, the relevant solution concept for the game is clearly the Subgame
Perfect Nash Equilibrium.
In particular, Þniteness in the number of stages allows us to proceed by
backward induction. First, we will look for the equilibrium price conÞgurations
associated to generic pairs of qualities (t1> t2) in the price subgame, then, we will
solve for the mutually optimal qualities in the Þrst stage, and we will describe
the equilibrium quality and price strategies of the overall game.
For simplicity, in the analysis we will only focus on pure strategies Subgame
Perfect Nash Equilibrium.
2.6 Consumers Utility Function and Demand
Consumers are heterogeneous in their tastes for drugs. Each consumer is as-
sumed to have a most preferred drug } that is given by his location on the [0> 1]
line segment. In particular, we assume a mass of consumers standardized to 1
and uniformly distributed along the unit interval.
Importantly, consumers are endowed with a Þnite instant utility n when
consuming one of the drugs, equal across all individuals. Each consumer is
assumed to be restricted to buy just one unit from one single drug variety, or
none and, in a Þrst instance, we further assume that there are always possible
non buyers in the market.
In fact, given drugs varieties, qualities and prices, patients decide whether
to buy one unit of drug {1, one unit of drug {2, or, Þnally, not to buy any drug
at all.
In absence of any reimbursement policy, the model closely resembles the one
by Economides [3] . In fact, denote, for l = 1> 2, {l the drug l variety, tusl the
drug l quality, sl the drug l price, and w the disutility transportation cost.
As in Economides (1984), we assume that the consumers preferences para-
meter n is Þnite, and that the disutility incurred by a consumer located at }
consuming drug {l is linear in the distance between the horizontal characteris-
tics, w |}  {l|.8
7This assumption will, further in the chapter, allow us to deÞne an equilbrium for the local
monopolies case.
8Note that linear transportation costs might lead to the non-existence of a price equilibrium
in pure strategies when Þrms locations are close. Locations must be at most at 1
4
of distance
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Therefore, in our model with no reimbursement policy, consumer } utility
by consuming drug l, for l = 1> 2 is given by
X (};{l) = n + tusl  sl  w |}  {l|
If the consumer does not buy any of the drugs his utility is assumed to be
X (}; 0) = 0=
As shown by Economides (1984), the level of n is in fact crucial in the
determination of demand and of the consequent market structure. Indeed, for
high enough instant utility from treatment, consumers always buy some of the
dierentiated products and consequently the market is fully covered. This case
indeed encompasses the equivalent analysis by DAspremont, Gabszewicz and
Thisse [1] with an inÞnite instant utility from treatment. However, for medium
levels of the instant utility from treatment parameter, consumers at the edges
of the market choose to not consume any of the dierentiated commodities, so
that the market is only partially covered. Finally, for su!ciently low instant
utilities from treatment, also consumers whose horizontal dimension preferences
are close to the centre of the market, might be better o by not buying any of the
dierentiated products. In this case Þrms behave as local monopolists, selling
only to their relative neighborhoods.
3 Co-payment Reimbursement
We Þrst investigate the case where the expenses in pharmaceuticals are re-
imbursed through a co-payment system: patients are reimbursed a fraction
0    1 of drug prices.
3.1 Demand
By assuming, without loss of generality, unitary transportation cost w = 1, the
utility derived by a consumer located at } from buying drug l is given by
X = n + tusl  (1 )sl  |}  {l| l = 1> 2 (1)
As mentioned above, the Þnite instant utility from treatment for patients
(n) plays a crucial role in the determination of the market coverage.
The level of market coverage, in turn, has an important impact on the degree
of competition between Þrms. Also in presence of a co-payment reimbursement,
in fact, depending on market coverage, competition might be tighter or softer.
In particular, market conÞguration might be such that duopoly competition
occurs: the two Þrms actively compete for serving the demand located in the
centre of the market. Within this competitive scenario, it may also happen
that all the consumers buy some drugs. In fact, the market is fully covered
whenever patients show su!ciently high willingness to pay. However, for an
intermediate instant utility from treatment n, consumers at the edges of the
to the extremes for a price equilibrium to exist. For a full discussion on this topic see [1]
8
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market choose to not consume any of the dierentiated commodities. In fact,
even in a competitive scenario, the market can also be only partially covered. In
such a case, reimbursement policy may be seen as not fully eective. Finally, it
might also occur that the two Þrms behave as natural monopolies. In fact, for
low willingness to pay, also patients located around the centre of the market may
opt out of not buying anything. In this case Þrms behave as local monopolists,
selling only to their relative neighborhoods.
The market in the three cases can be represented in the following diagram,
0   Z1                                        Z3         Z*     Z4                                        Z2   1
k1
k2
k3
Figure 1: Market structures
Therefore, it can be noticed that demand has a kinked structure and, con-
sequently, is not continuously dierentiable everywhere. As this implies that
proÞt functions are also not continuously dierentiable everywhere, computing
Þrms best response functions may be not straightforward. To deal with this, in
our model of co-payment scheme, we need to deÞne, for each demand segment,
the respective proÞt function. These demand segments depend both on Þrms
strategies and on the level of consumers treatment instant utilities.
3.1.1 Intermediate treatment instant utilities: the competitive sce-
nario with partial coverage
For intermediate values of n, there are consumers at the edges of the market that
do not buy any of the drugs. From now on we will refer to this case, illustrated
in Figure 1 (for n2), as the competitive scenario with partial coverage. Denote
} as the location of the consumer who is indierent between buying the drug
produced by Þrm 1 and the drug produced by Þrm 2. Moreover, denote as }1
the location of the consumer indierent between buying drug 1 or not buying
any of the dierentiated drugs existing in the market and as }4 the location
of the consumer indierent between buying drug 2 or not buying any of the
dierentiated drugs existing in the market. As patients derive disutility from
the distance between their most preferred drug and the drug they buy, we have
that for } 5 [0> }1[ we have X(};{2) ? X(};{1) ? X(}; 0). On the other hand,
for } 5 ]}1> }[ we have that X(}; 0) ? X(};{2) ? X(};{1): consumers located in
9
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the interval } 5 ]}1> }[ prefer buying Þrms 1 drug than buying drug 2 or than
not buying any drug at all. For } 5 ]}> }4[ we have that X(};{1) ? X(}; 0)
? X(};{2)= Finally, also all the consumers located in the segment } 5 ]}4> 1], are
better o by not buying any drug at all: X(};{1) ? X(};{2) ? X(}; 0). Thus,
}1> }4 and } will be the solutions of X(}; 0) = X(};{1)> X(};{2) = X(}; 0) and
X(};{2) = X(};{1) respectively. Therefore, from the expression for the utility
function, we may immediately work out }1> }4 and } as functions of prices,
varieties and qualities:9
}1 (s1> t1) = (1 ) s1 + {1  n  t1 (2)
} (s1> t1; s2> t2) =
(1 ) (s2  s1) + ({1 + {2) + t1  t2
2
}4 (s2> t2) = n + t2 + {2  (1 ) s2
As each consumer demands just one unit of drug and is assumed to be
endowed with su!cient income to aord its price, total demand is given by
G =
}4Z
}1
i (}) g} with G1 =
}Z
}1
i (}) g} being served by Þrm 1 and the remaining
G2 =
}4Z
}
i (}) g} consumers by Þrm 2. Thus, with } uniformly distributed on
the support [0> 1], Þrms demands are given by,
G1 = }  }1 (3)
G2 = }4  }
It can be seen that Þrms demands depend positively on the consumers
instant utility from treatment n. Moreover, each Þrms demand increases in
the competitor price and decreases in its own price. The impact of  on Þrms
demand depend on the pricing strategies
CGl
Csl
? 0> CGlCsm
A 0
CGl
C =
1
2
(sl  sm) + sl l> m = 1> 2 l 6= m
The eect of the reimbursement rate  in demand can be decomposed into
two eects. Indeed,  aects both the consumers choosing to always buying
from one of the Þrms and the consumers deciding whether to buy one unit of the
dierentiated product, or no product at all. Then, an increase in  increases the
number of the second type consumers and, depending on Þrms prices dierence,
9This assumption will be kept throughout the article
10
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might increase or decrease the number of consumers that switch from one drug
to the other.
If Þrms set equal prices, the impact of  on demand boils down to CGlC =
sl: therefore, the reimbursement rate  has no impact on the allocation of
consumers between Þrms, and only aects, positively, the number of consumers
facing the decision of whether to buy something or not to buy at all. If a
Þrm sets a higher price, say s2 A s1 then an increase in  allows not only the
consumers currently not purchasing anything to buy from Þrm 1, but also the
ones currently buying from Þrm 2 to switch to Þrm 1 instead.
3.1.2 High instant utility from treatment: the competitive scenario
with full coverage
For n su!ciently high all consumers buy one of the drugs. In such a case, illus-
trated in Þgure 1 (for n1), for any } 5 [0> 1], X (};{l) A X (}; 0): all consumers
are better o by buying one of the drugs. We refer to this case as the competi-
tive scenario with full coverage. The market is fully covered and Þrms demand
functions are given by,
G1 = }> G2 = 1 }
Notice that, here, demand does not depend on the instant utility from treatment
n. Indeed, in this case, the instant utility from treatment n is assumed to be
so big that the market is fully covered, and all consumers buy the dierentiated
product.
The eect of the reimbursement rate  on one Þrms demand depends on
the its own price and the price of its competitor,
CGl
C =
sl  sm
2
l> m = 1> 2, l 6= m
While in the previous case the reimbursement rate had an impact on both the
choice of whether to buy or not and on the decision from which Þrm to buy,
in this case the reimbursement rate only aects the allocation of consumers
between drugs.
Concerning the eect of pricing strategies on Þrms demands we have that
CGl
Csl
? 0> CGlCsm
A 0 l> m = 1> 2, l 6= m
Again, Þrms demand is a decreasing function of its own price and increases in
the competitor price.
3.1.3 Low instant utility from treatment n: local monopolies
Finally, for su!ciently low treatment instant utilities, consumers located close to
the centre are better o by not participating in the market and, consequently,
Þrms behave as local monopolists. That is, for any } 5 ]}2> }3[, X (};{l) ?
11
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X (}; 0). By referring to Figure 1 (for n3), let }1 (s1) and }3 (s1) be the consumers
indierent between buying from Þrm 1 while }2 (s2) and }4 (s2) be the consumers
indierent between buying from Þrm 2 or not buying any of the drugs: in such
a case we have that for } 5 {}1> }3}, X (};{1) = X (}; 0) and for } 5 {}2> }4},
X (};{2) = X (}; 0). Therefore, from the expression for the utility function, we
may immediately work out }1> }2> }3 and }4 as functions of prices, varieties and
qualities:
Each Þrm demand is then given by,
G1 = }3 (s1> t1) }1 (s1> t1) (4)
G2 = }4 (s2> t2) }2 (s2> t2)
Therefore, it can be seen that Þrms demands are increasing in both the instant
utility from treatment n and the reimbursement rate . Moreover, the mag-
nitude of the eect of  on one Þrms demand depends only on its own pricing
strategy: CGlC = 2sl for l = 1> 2. Under local monopolies, the reimbursement
rate has no eect on the distribution of consumers between Þrms. Indeed, under
this market structure, Þrms do not compete for consumers, acting instead as a
monopolist for a demand segment.
Demand does not depend on the competitors price and decreases in Þrms
own price,
CGl
Csl
? 0> CGlCsm
= 0 l> m = 1> 2, l 6= m
Naturally, the above described demand structure will imply a step proÞt
function for both Þrms, that we will describe in depth later.
3.1.4 Market coverage
Finally, let P (0 P  1) be the number of consumers buying the dierenti-
ated product, i.e., the market coverage. Generally P is given by
P = min {}4> 1}max {}2> }}+min {}3> }}max {}1> 0} (5)
Hence, when the market is served by two local monopolistsP = }4}2+}3}1.
In a competitive market with partial coverage P = }4  }1. Finally under full
coverage P = 1=10
Depending on the exogenous parameters n> {1 and {2 the market conÞgura-
tion will dier. Indeed we can have a competitive scenario, local monopolies or
10Furthermore, for sake of completeness, we should mention that, besides the three scenarios
described above, a last case is in theory possible. Indeed, it may potentially occur that
the endogenous market structure would be characterized by just a single Þrm acting as a
monopolist over all the demand, while the other Þrm is pushed out of the market, earning
zero proÞts. However, such a market structure will never arise as the equilibrium outcome of
the above two-stages game. Clearly, the reason is a standard undercutting argument: the Þrm
out of the market will always have incentives to undercut on the monopolists price strategy
in order to gain at least some of the market.
12
CHE Research Paper 25
__________________________________________________________________ 
exogenous full market coverage. In a competitive scenario and in local monop-
olies there are several possible sub conÞgurations namely:
 There are non buyers in both extremes of the market (Figures (a) and
(e))
 Both extremes of the market are endogenously fully covered in (Figures
(b) and (f))
 There are non buyers on the left extreme of the market but on the right
extreme all consumers buy (Figures (c) and (g))
 There are non buyers on the right extreme of the market but on the left
extreme all consumers buy (Figures (d) and (h))
Graphically and for the competitive scenario,
0     Z1                       Z*               Z2 1
Figure (a)
0                Z*               1
Figure (b)
0     Z1                       Z*                1
Figure (c)
0    Z*               Z2 1
Figure (d)
In the local monopolies scenario,
13
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0     Z1                     Z3 Z4 Z2 1
Figure (e)
0     Z3 Z4 1
Figure (f)
0     Z1                              Z3 Z4 1
Figure (g)
0                     Z3 Z4 Z2 1
Figure (h)
In the following sections, then, we will analyse in greater details the duopoly
two-stages game for the three above scenarios: competitive with full or partial
coverage, and local monopolies. However in the main text we focus only on the
cases illustrated in Þgures (a), (b), (e) and (f). The remaining cases can be
found in appendix.
3.2 The price game
In this stage Þrms compete simultaneously in prices. With sl the drug price of
Þrm l, and Gl the demand faced by Þrm l, the duopolists proÞt functions l are
given by,
l = slGl 
t2l
2
l = 1> 2 (6)
As mentioned before, as the demand function is kinked, Þrms proÞt func-
tions are segmented. Thus, given (4), if
0  s1  s2 +
t1  t2
(1 ) +
{1  {2
(1 ) (7)
the Þrm will be a monopolist and the proÞt function is given by,
1 = s1 (}4  }1)
t21
2
Otherwise, if
s2 +
t1  t2
(1 ) +
{1  {2
(1 )  s1 
t1 + t2 + {1  {2  (1 ) s2 + 2n
1  (8)
14
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the market structure will be competitive and the Þrm 1 proÞt is given by,
1 = s1 (}  }1)
t21
2
Finally, if
if
t1 + t2 + {1  {2  (1 ) s2 + 2n
1   s1 
n + t1 + {1
1  (9)
the market structure will be characterized by local monopolies and Þrm 1 proÞt
function is given by,
1 = s1 (}3  }1)
t21
2
We will now look for the Nash Equilibria in pure strategies (NE) of the
simultaneous moves price game played by the two Þrms in the last stage of the
overall game.
A price sl such that 0  sl  sm + t
us
l tm
(1) +
{l{m
(1) l> m = 1> 2 and l 6= m, can
never constitute a pure strategies Nash Equilibrium of the price subgame. The
proof consists of a standard undercutting argument. Within this price range
one of the Þrms will be a monopolists and the second Þrm would be out of the
market, earning zero proÞts. The latter will always have incentives to undercut
on the monopolist price strategy in order to gain the whole demand.
Having ruled out the monopolist case as a candidate Nash equilibrium in
the price subgame, we will then focus on the two polar cases: competitive sce-
nario, either with partial or full coverage, and the local monopolists scenario.
Maximizing proÞts with respect to prices and solving the Þrst order conditions,
the Nash Equilibrium in the price game for these two cases is summarized in
the propositions that follow,
Proposition 1 For n ? {2  {1  t1+t22 11with l> m = 1> 2 and l 6= m the market
is characterized by two local monopolists and the Nash Equilibrium in the price
stage is given by12 ,
sopl =
n + tusl
2 (1 ) l = 1> 2 (10)
For t1  t2 A 711 ({2  {1) and n A 56{2  32{1 + 13 
t2+t1
2
13 the market is
11This inequality ensures that sl M
k tl+tm+{l3{m3(13)sm+2n
13 >
n+tl
13
l
and can be easily
computed by plugging the equilibrium prices and solving for n.
12Second order conditions are always satisÞed. Indeed, C
2l
Cs2l
= 34 + 4 ? 0.
13These are market structure conditions. For reservation prices that satisfy these conditions
the market will be competitive. They are easily obtained by plugging the equilibrium prices
in the condition sl M
k
sm + tl3tm(13) +
{13{2
(13) >
tl+tm+{13{23(13)sm+2n
13
l
15
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competitive and the Nash Equilibrium in the price stage is 14
sf1 =
7 ({1  {2) + 3t2  17t1  14n
35 ( 1)
sf2 =
7 ({1  {2) + 3t1  17t2  14n
35 ( 1) (11)
For sl 5
h
tusl +tm+{1{2(1)sm+2n
1 >
n+tusl
1
i
with l> m = 1> 2 and l 6= m15 Þrms
do not compete for the marginal consumer. There are consumers in the centre
of the market that are better o by not buying any of the drugs. Hence, Þrms
behave like local monopolists.
Notice, however, that if, for some parameters conÞguration,
n+tusl
2(1) does not
fall in the interval
h
tusl +tm+{1{2(1)sm+2n
1 >
n+tusl
1
i
, then the local monopolist
Nash equilibrium can not exist in the price subgame.
In such a case, having ruled out the existence of a NE where just one Þrm
covers the whole market, a Nash Equilibrium of the price subgame, if any, needs
to be in the last, competitive scenario.
The latter occurs whenever sl 5
h
sm + t
us
l tm
(1) +
{1{2
(1) >
tusl +tm+{1{2(1)sm+2n
1
i
, Þrms proÞt functions being 1 = s1 (}  }1) t
2
1
2
and 2 = s2 (}4  }) t
2
2
2
Equilibrium prices increase with the degree of horizontal and vertical dier-
entiation, the instant utility from treatment n and with the co-payment rate
.
3.3 The Quality Game
Plugging the above found NE prices for each scenario in the relative range of
the Þrms proÞt functions, and maximizing with respect to qualities, we obtain
the optimal quality levels for the given prices. Substituting back these optimal
qualities in the Nash Equilibrium prices, we are then able to fully characterize
the subgame perfect NE of the two-stage quality-then-price game. The sub game
perfect Nash Equilibrium will depend on the co-payment rate. For low treatment
instant utilities (low n), the market will be served by two local monopolists and
the SPNE is described in the proposition that follows.
Proposition 2 For su!ciently low treatment instant utilities Þrms behave as
local monopolists and the SPNE will depend on the level of the preferences pa-
rameter n. For n ? 2{1 T and n ? {2  {1 T the market is partly covered
with non buyers on both extremes of the market and the SPNE is characterized
by,
tl = T> sl =
n +T
2 (1 ) l = 1> 2 (12)
14Second order conditions always satisÞed indeed, C
2l
Cs2l
= 33 + 3 ? 0.
15From the market structure conditions
16
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Finally, for n A 2 2{2 T and {1  {2  12 the market is partly covered with
consumers located around the centre of the market being the only non buyers.
The SPNE is given by,
t1 = 2{1  n (13)
t2 = 2 2{2  n
s1 =
{1
1 
s2 =
1 {2
1 
Proof. Proof in Appendix A
When the market is served by two local monopolists, for low instant utilities
from treatment, i.e., n ? 2{1T, Þrms pricing and quality strategies are equal
and the market is partly covered with consumers on both sides of the market not
consuming any of the drugs. The market coverage is given by Pf = 2n + 2T.
Finally, also for n A 2  2{2  T drugs prices and qualities dier among
Þrms. Indeed,
s = s1  s2 =
{1 + {2  1
(1 )
t = t1  t2 = 2 ({1 + {2  1)
For {1 + {2 ? 1 (A 1) drug 1 is sold at a lower (higher) price and quality
than drug 2, i.e., s ? 0 (A 0) and t ? 0 (A 0). Market coverage is given
by Pf = 2 2{2 + 2{1.
In a competitive scenario given that the second order conditions are satisÞed
for  5 [0> 0=29]16 the analysis will be done within this range. More precisely, we
will have two sets of results one for  5 [0> 0=16] and other for  5 [0=16> 0=29].
Therefore for  5 [0> 0=16] equilibrium will be characterized by full market cov-
erage. Note that a equilibrium with partial market coverage will never arise.
The thresholds of n that deÞne the dierent equilibria are very long expres-
sions, therefore in the propositions that follow we use a label for each of these
expressions and relegate the full expression for the appendix.
Proposition 3 For n 5 [n2f> n3f] , {1 5
£
{2  12 > 12
¤
and {2 5
£
1
2 > 1
¤
, the market
is fully covered and the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium qualities and prices
16This condition arises by a direct computation of the second order condition.
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are17
t1 =
5{1 + 2{2  1 3n
3
(14)
t2 =
6 3n  2{1  5{2
3
(15)
s1 =
2{1 + 2{2  1
3 (1 )
s2 =
3 2{1  2{2
3 (1 ) (16)
Proof. Proof in Appendix A
For high instant utilities from treatment, i.e. n 5 [n2f> n3f], the market is
(endogenously) fully covered (Pf = 1) and, by standard comparative statics
analysis, it immediately follows that,
Ctl
C = 0>
Csl
C A 0>
Ctl
Cn ? 0>
Csl
Cn = 0 l = 1> 2
the eect of the reimbursement rate on quality is null, but is positive on equi-
librium prices. Furthermore, the preferences parameter n has a negative eect
on quality but a nil eect on prices.
Moreover, optimal Þrms prices and qualities might dier. These dierences
are a function of both locations and the reimbursement variable :
s = s1  s2 =
4 ({1 + {2  1)
3 (1 ) (17)
t = t1  t2 =
7
3
({1 + {2  1)
Analysing these quality and price gaps, between Þrms, we have that
C(s
1
s
2
)
C =
(1{1+{2)(3+)
(1)3 and
C(t
1
t
2
)
C =
2({1+{21)
(1)2 . Hence, for {1+{2 ? 1 (A 1) the drug
produced by Þrm 1 is less (more) expensive and has lower (higher) quality than
the drug produced by Þrm 2. Moreover, the price gap is decreasing (increasing)
in the reimbursement variable .
We will now describe the results for the remaining range of co-payment rates,
i.e. for  5 [0=16> 0=29]. For higher co-payment rates, i.e.  5 [0=16> 0=29], the
above described competitive equilibrium with full market coverage will still hold
(even though the range of the preferences parameter n for which it exists will
dier) but the local monopolies equilibria will no longer exist18 . Additionally,
17Second order conditions satisÞed for
C2l
Ct2l
= 1225335
1225(13) ? 0 =i  ? 0=29
18Note that for some parameter conÞgurations we could have that by increasing n the
market structure would switch from competitive to local monopolies. Nevertheless, allowing
for this possibility would lead to further sub-cases that would not bring further insight on
the qualitative results despite of complicating even further the analysis. Therefore we have
restrained the analysis from these cases and focus on the range of parameters for which they
will not arise.
18
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the existence of an equilibrium with partial market coverage will depend on the
relation between Þrms locations, namely on whether {1 A {23 or {1  {23 holds.
Therefore, the SPNE in this case is given by,
Proposition 4 For n 5 [n1f> n3f] and under condition
1 =
;
?
=
{1 5
£
{2  12 > 12
¤
{2 5
£
1
2 > 1
¤
{1 + {2 A 12
the market is fully covered and the SPNE is given by (14)
Proof. Proof in Appendix A
On the other hand we will now describe a situation where multiple equilibria
can arise.
Proposition 5 For {23 ? {1 ? 0=46{2, for n 5 [0> n6f] we have multiple equi-
libria. The sub game perfect Nash equilibrium with partial market coverage is
given by,
tl =
51 ({1  {2  2n)
175 73 (18)
sl =
35 ({1  {2  2n)
175 73
Within the same range of locations,{23 ? {1 ? 0=46{2> but for n 5 [n1f> n3f]
instead, there still exists a SPNE with full market coverage characterized by
(14).
Proof. Proof in Appendix A
Hence, for such range of locations we have two separate equilibria each arising
within a speciÞc interval of the preferences parameter n.
Finally, results remain qualitatively the same for {1 A 0=46{2 with the only
prominent dierence that there is an interval of (low) values of n within which
only an equilibrium with partial market coverage exists.
Proposition 6 For {1 A 0=46{2 and n 5 [0> n6f] there is a unique SPNE char-
acterized by symmetric partial coverage (18). Finally for n 5 [n1f> n3f] the mar-
ket is fully covered and the SPNE is given by (14).
Proof. Proof in Appendix A
Analysing the results described in the propositions, for n 5 [n1f> n3f] and
119 the market is endogenously fully covered (P = 1) and the price and
quality gaps are given by (17). For {1 A {23 a new equilibrium exists (under
the conditions speciÞed in propositions 6 and 7). When this equilibrium holds
19Recall that l1 =
;
?
=
{1 M

{2 3 12 >
1
2

{2 M

1
2
> 1

{1 + {2 A 12
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Þrms pricing and quality strategies are equal, implying null quality and price
gaps, i.e. s = t = 0= The market is partially covered and the number of
consumers buying a drug is given by,
Pf = 105 (2n + {2  {1) (1 )
73 175 ? 1
Finally, results remain qualitatively the same for {1 A 0=46{2 with the only
prominent dierence that there is an interval of (low) values of n within which
only the equilibrium with partial market coverage exists.
Proposition 7 For {1 A 0=46{2 and n 5 [0> n6f] there is a unique SPNE char-
acterized by symmetric partial coverage (18). Instead, for n 5 [n1f> n3f]20 the
market is fully covered and the SPNE is given by (14).
Proof. Proof in Appendix A
4 Reference Pricing
In this section we address the analysis of the eects of reference pricing on Þrms
quality and price strategies. The model structure follows closely the one used
in the previous section, only diering in the reimbursement system.
Expenses in pharmaceuticals are reimbursed through a reference pricing sys-
tem: patients are reimbursed a lump sum amount su independently of the drug
bought. Therefore, with respect to the Co-payment reimbursement, the refer-
ence pricing simply changes the utility function and consequently the indierent
consumers and demand functions.
The utility derived by a consumer located at } from buying drug l is then
now given by
X = n + tusl  (sl  su) w |}  {l| l = 1> 2
Proceeding in the same way as in the previous section, within a competitive
market the marginal consumers are
It follows that the demand of Þrm 1 and 2 are given by
G1 =
3t1  t2  3s1 + s2 + {2  {1 + 2 (su + n)
2
(19)
G2 =
3t2  t1  3s2 + s1 + {2  {1 + 2 (su + n)
2
Firm l demand increases on Þrm m prices and decreases on its own price. The
reference price and the instant utility from treatment n have a positive impact
on demand. Accordingly,
20With n1f and n3f standing, respectively, for the treshold n that solves the cosntraint
associated with the non negativity of the indierent consumer location and t1 = 0.
20
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CGl
Csl
? 0> CGlCsm
A 0> CGlCn =
CGl
Cn A 0 l> m = 1> 2 l 6= m
An interesting point, is that these eects do not depend on the reference
price value. A variation on su has quantitatively the same impact on both
Þrms demand, and is independent of pricing strategies, and does not aect the
allocation of consumers between Þrms. Moreover, notice that the eect of the
pricing strategies on Þrms demand is higher than under the co-payment policy.
In the local monopolists scenario each Þrm demand is now given by,
G1 = }3 (s1> t1) }1 (s1> t1) (20)
G2 = }4 (s2> t2) }2 (s2> t2)
Also here, we observe that demand is not aected by the competitors price
and is decreasing in Þrms own price. Both reference price and the preferences
parameter n have a positive impact on Þrms demand: in fact they both increase
the number of buyers in the market.
In the three possible market conÞgurations, both Þrms demand depend
positively on preferences parameter, n> and on the reference price su. Moreover
the impact of these two parameters on the demand is exactly the same and its
magnitude does not depend on Þrmss strategies.
4.1 The price game
We now look for the pure-strategies subgame perfect Nash Equilibria of the
two stages quality-then-price game. As usual, by backward induction, we Þrst
describe the Nash equilibria of the simultaneous moves price game in the second
stage.
Maximizing proÞts with respect to prices and solving the system of Þrst
order conditions, the Nash Equilibria in the price game will be analysed under
each of the three dierent market structures: monopoly, competitive equilibria
and local monopolists.
Once again, for s1 5 [0> s2 + t1  t2 + {1  {2] and s2 5 [0> s1 + t2
t1 + {1  {2] no Nash Equilibrium in the price game can ever exist. In fact,
within this price range one of the Þrms will be a monopolist and the other
would be out of the market. The latter will always have incentives to pick up
a dierent strategy in order to improve proÞts. Hence we will focus on the two
polar cases: competitive scenario and the local monopolists scenario.
Proposition 8 Under a competitive market, the Nash Equilibrium in the price
21
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stage is21
sus1 =
2 (su + n) + {2  {1
5
+
17t2  3t1
35
(21)
sus2 =
2 (su + n) + {2  {1
5
+
17t1  3t2
35
Proof. Proof in Appendix B
In this case we have that prices are increasing in the reference price and in
the instant utility from treatment n.
Proposition 9 Within the local monopolists scenario ({m  {l) A t
us
l
2  tm and
n A {m  {l  su  t
us
l +tm
2
22 with l> m = 1> 2 and m 6= l the Nash Equilibrium in
the price stage is23
sopl =
n + su + tusl
2
(22)
Proof. Proof in Appendix B
Again, it can be noticed that both the instant utility from treatment n and
the reference price have a positive eect on the price level.
For sl 5 [sm + tusl  tm + {1  {2> tusl + tm + {1  {2  sm + 2 (n + su)] Þrm
1 and Þrm 2 do not compete for the marginal consumer. There are consumers
in the centre of the market that are better o by not buying any of the drugs.
Hence, Þrms behave like local monopolists. If spl does not fall in that interval,
then the local monopolist equilibrium does not exist, and the only price game
Nash equilibrium is the one under the competitive scenario.
4.2 The quality game
Plugging the above found NE prices for each scenario into the relative range of
the Þrms proÞt functions, and maximizing with respect to qualities, we obtain
the optimal quality levels for the given prices. Substituting back these optimal
qualities in the Nash Equilibrium prices, we are then able to fully characterize
the subgame perfect NE of the two-stage quality-then-price game.
Proposition 10 For su!ciently high preferences parameter n the market is
competitive. In particular, for n 5 [nll2> n11]24 the market is partly covered, and
the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, prices and qualities are given by,
t1 = t2 =
51 [2n + 2su + 1 2{1]
73
(23)
s1 = s2 =
35 [2n + 2su + 1 2{1]
73
21Second order conditions always satisÞed as C
2l
Cs2l
= 33 ? 0.
22These are market structure conditions. For ns satisfying this condition the market will
be served by two local monopolists. Can be easily obtained by plugging the equilibrium prices
in the conditions sl M [sm + tl 3 tm + {1 3 {2> tl + tm + {1 3 {2 3 sm ] + 2 (n + su)
23Second order conditions always satisÞed indeed, C
2l
C2sl
= 34 ? 0.
24With nll2 and n11 standing, respectively, for the treshold n that ensures, respectively, a
competitive market structure and the non-negativity of the indierent consumers location.
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Finally, for n 5 [n2s> n3s] and under condition  with,
 =
½
{1 5
£
{2  12 > 12
¤
{1 + {2 A 0=66
the market is (endogenously) fully covered and the SPNE is characterized by,
t1 =
5
3
{1 +
2
3
{2 
1
3
 (su + n) (24)
t2 = 2 n  su 
5
3
{2 
2
3
{1
s1 =
2 ({1 + {2) 1
3
s2 =
3 2 ({1 + {2)
3
Proof. Proof in Appendix B
For low preferences parameter n0the market will be served by two local
monopolies and the SPNE will depend on the state of art of quality, i.e. T.
Proposition 11 If the preferences parameters ns are su!ciently low the mar-
ket is served by two local monopolists. For n ? 2{1  n  su25 the SPNE is
characterized by,
tl = T (25)
sl =
n +T+ su
2
Finally, for n A 2{1  n  su26 by,
t1 = t2 = 2{1  n  su (26)
s1 = s2 = {1
Proof. Proof in Appendix B
For n 5 [nll2s> n11s] > the level of market coverage under a competitive market
with partial coverage is given by
PsfUS =
105
72
[2 (n + su) + {2  {1] (27)
Comparing the Þrms pricing strategies we have,
t = t1  t2 = 0 (28)
s = s1  s2 = 0
25This condition ensures that the constraint tl $ T for l = 1> 2 is binding.
26This condition ensures that the constraint tl $ T for l = 1> 2 is slack.
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Drugs are sold at the same price and have the same quality.
One can see that under a competitive market with partial coverage prices
and qualities are increasing in the reference price and in the instant utility from
treatment n. However, under a competitive scenario with full market coverage,
quality is decreasing with the instant utility from treatment (n) and reference
price while prices depend neither on n nor on the reference price. In a sense, in
terms of utility and therefore demand, quality has the same impact as both the
reference and the preferences parameter n. Once the market is fully covered, an
increase in the reference price and/or preferences parameter n does not further
increase demand (as the market is already fully covered). It, nevertheless, allows
the Þrm to (proÞtably) decrease the quality of the drug supplied, extracting (the
extra) surplus from the consumers.
Still on a competitive market structure for n 5 [n2> n3] the market is fully
covered (PsfUS = 1). Comparing drugs prices and qualities
t = t1  t2 =
7
3
({1 + {2  1) (29)
s = s1  s2 =
4
3
({1 + {2  1)
When the market is fully covered, for a competitive market structure, Þrms
equilibrium strategies might dier. While under a co-payment reimbursement
these dierences are functions of both locations and reimbursement rate, under
reference pricing they are a function of locations only. Only when Þrms are
located symmetrically, {1 + {2 = 1, are drugs prices and qualities the same
in equilibrium. However, this no longer holds for asymmetric locations. In
particular, if {1 + {2 A 1 (? 1) drug 1 has higher (lower) quality but also
higher (lower) price than drug 2. The reason is quite intuitive. For asymmetric
locations one of the Þrms serves a larger neighborhood and, therefore, has a
privileged position that allows it to sell its drug at higher price and quality.
Concerning local monopolies, by deÞnition of this market structure, the mar-
ket is always partly covered, as, at least, consumers located in between the two
Þrms do not buy any of the drugs. Nevertheless, the market coverage increases
with the preferences parameter n.
For n ? 2{1  n  su market coverage is given by
P op = 2n + 2T+ 2su ? 1
Quality and price gaps are given by,
t = t1  t2 = s = s1  s2 = 0
For low ns Þrms pricing and quality strategies are the same. Indeed, for such
low instant utilities even with asymmetric locations the sub market faced by
each Þrm has the same structure in the sense that their distance to the ends
of the market is su!ciently big to both Þrms in order to restrain them from
choosing qualities and prices that would allow all consumers located at the ends
of the market to consume.
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Finally, for n A 2 2{2  n  su market coverage is given by
P op = 2{1  2{2 + 2
In this case, the only consumers that opted out from the market are (some
of the) consumers located between the two Þrms while all the others, including
the individuals located towards the ends of the market, always buy one of the
drugs. The quality and price gaps are given by,
t = t1  t2 = 2{1 + 2{2  2 ? 0 (30)
s = s1  s2 = {1 + {2  1 ? 0
Also here, for the locational advantage of Þrm 2 mentioned before, Þrm 1 will
price at a lower level and supply less quality than Þrm 2.
5 Exogenous Full Market Coverage
The model developed above did not assume full market coverage beforehand,
instead, market coverage was endogenous. However one may argue that this
might not be the case specially in the market for prescription drugs. Indeed,
the trend in the literature has been to follow the model by dAspremont and
Thisse that assume an inelastic demand, in that consumers instant utility n is
so high that they are always willing to buy some of the drugs. This scenario
corresponds to medical conditions in which consumers obtain very high health
beneÞts from taking a drug, or in which patients suer very hard health conse-
quences when deprived from any drug consumption. Since we are imposing full
market coverage we will designate this model by- exogenous market coverage.
Investigating these scenarios emphasizes the role of competition between the
two Þrms and underlines the eects of reimbursement policies on Þrms strate-
gies. In the following, we Þrst describe the case of co-payment reimbursement,
and then the one of reference pricing.
5.1 Co-payment System
The general model adopted above will be just speciÞed by imposing exogenous
full market coverage: }1 = 0 and }4 = 1. Implying the following demands,
G1 = }> G2 = 1 } (31)
which do not depend on the instant utility level n, with
} = (1 ) (s2  s1) + ({1 + {2) + t1  t2
2
The impact of the reimbursement rate  on Þrms demand depends, quali-
tatively and quantitatively, on Þrms pricing strategies
CGl
C =
sl  sm
2
l> m = 1> 2 and l 6= m.
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As, by the full market coverage assumption, all individuals buy one unit of
the dierentiated product, the reimbursement rate only aects the allocation of
consumers between drugs.
Concerning the impact of pricing strategies on Þrms demand, from
CGl
Csl
? 0> CGlCsm
A 0 l> m = 1> 2, l 6= m
it can be seen that a Þrm demand is a decreasing function of its own price and
increasing in the competitor price. The size of these eects is softened by .
As, for n su!ciently high, all consumers buy a drug from one of the two
Þrms, from (31), Þrms proÞt functions with the co-payment reimbursement are
1 = s1
µ
(1 ) (s2  s1) + ({1 + {2) + t1  t2
2
¶
 t
2
1
2
2 = s2
µ
2 (1 ) (s2  s1) ({1 + {2) t1 + t2
2
¶
 t
2
2
2
(32)
Again, Þrms maximize their proÞts in a two-stage game, by Þrst deciding qual-
ity strategies and then prices. The equilibrium is summarized the following
Proposition.
Proposition 12 Under a co-payment reimbursement system the subgame per-
fect Nash Equilibrium prices and qualities are27
s1 =
6 4 3 ({1 + {2) (1 )
(1 ) (9 7) (33)
s2 =
12 10 + 3 ({1 + {2) (1 )
(1 ) (9 7)
t1 =
6 4 3 ({1 + {2) (1 )
3 (1 ) (9 7)
t2 =
12 10 + 3 ({1 + {2) (1 )
3 (1 ) (9 7)
Proof. Proof in Appendix C
It follows immediately that the reimbursement rate  has a positive eect
on equilibrium prices and quality. Indeed, proceeding with comparative statics
analysis we have that,
Csl
C A 0>
Ctusl
C A 0, l = 1> 2
Equilibrium price and quality dierences are functions of both locations and
reimbursement rate , indeed,
27Second order conditions in the price stage satisÞed for  M [0> 1] and in the quality stage
for  ? 8
9
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sF = s1  s2 =
6 (1 {1  {2)
(9 7) (34)
tF = t1  t2 =
2 (1 {1  {2)
(9 7)
Moreover the drug supplied by drug 1 will be sold at a lower price and lower
quality, i.e., sF ? 0 and tF ? 0 28 This result arises from the nature of the
asymmetry on locations that we have assumed, i.e., 1 A {1 + {2.
5.2 Reference Pricing
We now describe the model with exogenous full market coverage under a ref-
erence pricing policy. Demands are given by G1 = } and G2 = 1  }, with
} = (s2s1)+({1+{2)+t1t22
From these demands, Þrms proÞt functions follow:
1 = s1
µs2  s1 + ({1 + {2) + t1  t2
2
¶
 t
2
1
2
(35)
2 = s2
µ
1 s2  s1 + ({1 + {2) + t1  t2
2
¶
 t
2
2
2
A crucial aspect to be noticed is that, under reference pricing, the demand
functions are aected neither by the instant utility n nor by the reference price
su Therefore, Þrms strategies will be independent from both of these variables.
This result is clearly due to the joint outcome of two hypotheses in force. First,
by assuming that the market is fully covered, reference pricing can not have any
impact on consumers choice on whether to buy, or not, some of the dierentiated
products. Secondly, as the reference pricing is a lump sum reimbursement, it
can not aect the distribution of consumers between Þrms.
Furthermore, Þrms demand depends positively on the competitor price and
decreases in its own price.
Proposition 13 Under the reference pricing system the subgame perfect Nash
28Note that for tl A 0 and sl A 0 for l = 1> 2 the numerators of the equilibrium prices
and qualities in (33) can not be simultaneously (i.e. for both Þrms) positive. Therefore,
for negative numerators, the denominators must be negative for strictly positive equilibrium
qualities and prices, implying that  ? 7
9
. Consequently, for 1 A {1 + {2, {sF ? 0 and
{tF ? 0
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Equilibrium prices and qualities is29 ,
s1 =
3 ({1 + {2) + 4
7
(36)
t1 =
3 ({1 + {2) + 4
21
s2 =
10 3 ({1 + {2)
7
t2 =
10 3 ({1 + {2)
21
Proof. Proof in Appendix C
It can be seen that, under reference pricing, price and quality dierences
depend only on Þrms locations,
sUS = s1  s2 =
6 ({1 + {2  1)
7
(37)
tUS = t1  t2 =
6 ({1 + {2  1)
21
Once again, for {1+{2 A 1 (? 1) drug 1 (2) is sold at a higher (lower) price
and at a higher (lower) quality than drug 2 (1).
When the preferences parameter n is high enough, consumers will always
buy the dierentiated product. This sort of demand rigidity softens competitive
pressure on Þrms, which no longer need to compete for consumers at the edges
of the market. While, with partial market coverage, the reference price has an
impact on both demand and proÞts by reinforcing the eect of the instant utility
n, in the fully covered market case, the eect of n is so overwhelming that the
reference price has no marginal eect. In other words, in the former case, for a
given n, the level of su can aect proÞts by increasing demand. Conversely, in
the latter case, demand is already at its maximum, so that su has no inßuence
on it. In fact, equilibrium prices and qualities do not depend on its level.
On the other hand, the co-payment rate  has an impact on competition
between Þrms for consumers located towards the centre, namely for the marginal
consumer }. It is easy to see that, in this case, reference pricing is nested in
the co-payment system. Indeed, we have that whenever  $ 0, sfl $ sUSl :
in other words, the reference pricing system is equivalent, in terms of prices
and qualities, to a system where there is no reimbursement. The only role of
reference pricing is acting as "reimbursement ceiling" for the third party payer.
Therefore, contrary to co-payment rate , reference price can not be used as
a regulatory instrument for the determination of prices, qualities or for market
coverage.
Finally, by comparing the price and quality gaps across Þrms, we observe that
the relation between price and quality gaps under the two dierent reimburse-
ment systems depends not only on Þrms locations but also on the reimbursement
variable .
29Second order conditions always veriÞed
28
CHE Research Paper 25
__________________________________________________________________ 
sF sUS =
54 ({1 + {2  1)
7 (9 7)
tF tUS =
18 ({1 + {2  1)
7 (9 7)
Interestingly, the dierence in the gaps between the two reimbursement sys-
tems is not the same for prices and qualities level, sFsUS A tFtUS .
6 Reference Pricing vs Co-payment: the case of
symmetric locations
We will now compare prices, qualities and market coverage of the two reim-
bursement systems, for all the above described scenarios assuming symmetric
locations, i.e., {1 + {2 = 130 . In order to proceed with the comparisons, under
endogenous market coverage, we need to order the equilibria for all values of
the instant utility from treatment n. This analysis is done in appendix 3.
6.1 Competitive Market Structure
Since the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium under a co-payment depends on
the level of the co-payment rate the comparison analysis will be done for both
cases separately. Therefore, for  5 [0> 0=16] comparing the two reimbursement
systems leads to the results described in the following proposition.
The thresholds of su that deÞne the dierent equilibria are very long expres-
sions, therefore in the propositions that follow we use a label for each of these
expressions and relegate the full expression for the appendix.
Proposition 14 A co-payment system leads to higher prices and quality level
than a reference pricing system and at least the same, if not higher, market
coverage. More precisely, for low and medium reference prices, market coverage
is equal under the two reimbursement systems for high preferences parameter
and is higher under co-payment for low preferences parameter. Instead, for high
reference price levels both systems lead to full market coverage.
Proof. Proof in Appendix D
Note that under these parameters conÞgurations expenditure in pharma-
ceuticals is always higher under co-payment but also quality is. Moreover, for
low preferences parameter, this policy performs better than reference pricing in
terms of access to care.
Instead, for  5 [0=16> 0=29] the comparisons (in quality, prices and market
coverage) between a co-payment regime and a reference pricing will depend on
the reference pricing level and on the instant utility from treatment .
30The analysis remains the same as previously stated. Results can be easily derived by
substituiting {2 = 13 {1 in the results and conditions found above.
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Proposition 15 For low reference price levels, i.e. su ? su2, the equilibria
under reference pricing are described by (24) and (23) while under co-payment
by (14). Therefore, quality and prices are always higher under a co-payment
regime. Concerning market coverage, for su ? su13 market coverage is higher
under co-payment while for su 5 [su13> su2] in a reference pricing system there
are more consumers buying a drug31 .
Proof. Proof in Appendix D
While it is clear that for su ? su13 expenditure is higher under co-payment
for higher reference prices results are ambiguous. Nevertheless, for su ? su13,
even though expenditure in pharmaceuticals is higher for the co-payment sys-
tem relatively to a reference pricing system, this policy ensures higher market
coverage and consequently is superior in terms of access to care. These results
are speciÞc to the range of parameters deÞned in the proposition . Indeed, as
we will show in the following propositions, results are very sensitive to changes
in both reimbursement instruments and preferences parameter. For example,
in proposition 33 for low reference and preferences parameter quality is higher
and pharmaceutical expenditure is clearly lower under co-payment than under
reference pricing (due to lower prices and lower market coverage). Neverthe-
less, note that lower public expenditure, in this case, is achieved through not
only lower prices but also lower market coverage. While the former might be
desirable from a welfare perspective, the latter might jeopardize public policies
targeted at tackling inequalities on access to care.
Additionally, for higher preferences parameter we observe that co-payment
performances in terms of quality is weaken and becomes lower relatively to the
reference pricing policy.
Proposition 16 For medium reference price levels, i.e. su 5 [su2> su7], results
are ambiguous.
Proof. Proof in Appendix D
For low treatment instant utilities, i.e. n 5 [nll2s> n2s] > the SPNE under
a co-payment regime is characterized by (18) and under reference pricing by
(23). Under both systems the market is partly covered but the market coverage
is lower under a co-payment. For low treatment instant utilities, i.e. n 5
[nll2s> nh],co-payment system leads to higher quality and lower prices than a
reference pricing system. For medium-low instant utility parameter (n) levels,
i.e., n 5 [nh> n2s]results are reversed, i.e., under a co-payment system drugs have
a lower quality and higher prices than under a reference pricing system. For
n 5 [n2s> n6f]the SPNE under a co-payment regime is characterized by (18) and
under reference pricing by (24). While under reference pricing the market is
fully covered, under a co-payment policy there are consumers that opt-out from
the market. The relation between prices and quality between the two regimes
is again ambiguous and depends on the instant utility level.
31The conditions on the reference price are obtained by subtracting the equilibrium values
of co-payment and reference pricing.
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For n 5 [n2s> nj] prices and quality are higher under co-payment. While,
for n 5 [nj> n6f] under a co-payment system drugs are still sold at higher prices
than under reference pricing, but have also lower quality.
Finally, for n 5 [n6f> n3s]the market is fully covered under both regimes, and
the SPNE is characterized by (14) and (24) for the co-payment and reference
pricing respectively. For this range of treatment instant utilities, a co-payment
system allows higher quality but also higher prices than a reference pricing
policy. Also here expenditure in pharmaceuticals depends on the reimbursement
instruments and instant utility.
Proposition 17 For medium-high reference price levels, su 5 [su7> su3]32 , the
SPNE will depend on the instant utility.
Proof. Proof in Appendix D
For low treatment instant utilities, i.e. n 5 [nll2s> n2s] the SPNE under ref-
erence pricing is given by (23) while under co-payment by (18). The market
is partly covered under both policies and the market coverage is higher un-
der reference pricing. Prices are lower and quality higher under a co-payment
regime.
For n 5 [n2s> n6f] the market is still fully covered under a reference pricing
system but under a co-payment regime there are consumers not buying a drug.
For low treatment instant utilities, i.e., n 5 [n2s> nj] quality is higher under a co-
payment system and prices are lower. For medium treatment instant utilities,
i.e., n 5 [nj> nk] prices are still lower under co-payment than under reference
pricing but also quality is. For high treatment instant utilities, i.e., n 5 [nk> n6f]
a co-payment system leads to higher prices and lower quality than a reference
pricing system.
Still for the same range of reference pricing, for n 5 [n6f> n3s] the market
is fully covered under both regimes, and quality and prices are higher under
co-payment.
Proposition 18 For high reference price levels, i.e., su A su , both reimburse-
ment systems lead to partial coverage. Under a co-payment system drugs are
sold at higher quality and lower prices than under reference pricing.
Proof. Proof in Appendix D
Finally, this last proposition clearly describes a scenario where no only co-
payment ensures lower pharmaceutical expenditure and higher quality but also
full access to drugs.
6.2 Local Monopolies
In the same line as in the competitive scenario also local monopolies show a
multiplicity of results. Comparing prices, qualities and market coverage of the
32The conditions on the reference price are obtained by subtracting the equilibrium values
of co-payment and reference pricing.
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two reimbursement systems, results are summarized in the proposition that
follows.
Proposition 19 When Þrm one is closer to the left end of the market, i.e.
{1 ? 14 33 ,
 For low treatment instant utilities the two systems deliver the same quality
and price dierences between the two systems depend on the co-payment
rate.
 Namely, for a co-payment rate higher than 0=5, prices are higher
under co-payment
 While for lower co-payment rates, i.e.  ? 0=5, the reverse holds
Co-payment system leads to lower market coverage than a reference pricing
system.
 For medium treatment instant utilities a co-payment system delivers higher
quality than the reference pricing system but, at maximum, achieves the
same market coverage than reference pricing policies. On what concerns
prices, for intermediate treatment instant utilities co-payment leads to
lower prices than a reference pricing system, while for high instant utility
n levels prices, are higher under co-payment.
Proof. Proof in Appendix D
The following graph illustrates the results described in the proposition above,
33Note that linear transportation costs might lead to the non-existence of a price equilibrium
in pure strategies when Þrms locations are close. Locations must be at most at 1
4
of distance
to the extremes for a price equilibrium to exist. Therefore, under the linear transportation
cost assumption in our set up results are conÞned to the interval {1 M

0> 1
4

.
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7 Welfare
The analysis would not be complete without a welfare analysis. Hence, we will
now describe the implications for consumer surplus and total welfare of both
reimbursement policies.
Under a competitive scenario, with both full and partial coverage the con-
sumer surplus, FV, is given by
FV =
}1Z
0
X(}> 0)i (}) g} +
}Z
}1
X(}> {1)i (}) g} (38)
+
}4Z
}
X(}> {2)i (}) g}
1Z
}4
X(}> 0)i (}) g}
In fact, the Þrst and the last element represent the utility of the consumers
that do not buy any of the drugs, while the second and the third element
stand for the utility of the fraction of consumers that buy drug 1 and drug 2
respectively.
Under local monopolies, as consumers in the centre of the market do not buy
any of the dierentiated products, the consumer surplus is represented by
33
Referencing pricing versus co-payment in the pharmaceutical industry
__________________________________________________________________ 
FV =
}1Z
0
X(}> 0)i (}) g} +
}3Z
}1
X(}> {1)i (}) g} (39)
+
}2Z
}3
X(}> 0)i (}) g} +
}4Z
}2
X(}> {2)i (}) g} +
1Z
}4
X(}> 0)i (}) g}
The second term corresponds to the utility of the fraction of consumers that
buy drug 1, the fourth to the utility of consumers that buy drug 2 and the
remaining terms represent the utility of consumers that do not buy any of the
drugs.
Using an utilitarian welfare function, social welfare is given by
Z = FV +
2X
l=1
l  (1 + )U
Where U stands for the drug reimbursement paid by the third party payer
to the consumers. With (38) and (39) total Welfare in both reimbursement
systems for the dierent market structures can be easily computed by plugging
the SPNE found into the welfare function.
Given the diversity of the results described throughout the paper, the com-
parison between the welfare and surplus of the two reimbursement systems will
lead to a multiplicity of cases. Instead of describing the full characterization of
these comparisons we will restrict our analysis to two illustrative cases.
We will start with the case for which an equilibrium with full market coverage
holds for both reimbursement systems (for the co-payment it is given by (14)
and for the reference pricing by (24)). Recall that under this case the prices and
qualities were always higher under a co-payment than under a reference pricing
system. Then as gFVgt A 0 and gFVgs ? 0 and given that,
tfl  tusl = su
sfl  ssul =

3 (1 )
it is easy to show that the dierences in prices perfectly outweigh the dierences
in quality and, consequently, the two systems lead to the same level of consumer
surplus.
On what concerns Welfare there exists a threshold on  above (below) which
the a co-payment system leads to lower (higher) welfare than a reference pricing
policy. This threshold is given by  and is deÞned by34 ,
 = su (1 + 6n  6{1  3su)+ 3su ( 1)
34The treshold is the level of  that solves Z us

sWl > tWl

=Z f

sWl > tWl

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Therefore, we can conclude that, for this illustrative example, even though total
expenditure on pharmaceuticals is higher in a co-payment rather than under
a reference pricing policy and, for  ? > welfare is, also, higher than under
a reference pricing policy. Therefore, we can conclude that a socially optimal
reimbursement system must inevitably account for the trade-o between welfare
and cost control.
Consider now the case for which an equilibrium with full market coverage
holds for the co-payment system but, under reference pricing, the equilibrium
is such that the market is partly covered (the corresponding SPNE are given
by, respectively, (14) and (23)). Recall that under this case the prices, quality
and market coverage are always higher under a co-payment than under a ref-
erence pricing system then as gFVgt A 0 and gFVgs ? 0 the relation between the
consumer surplus under both regimes depends on the reimbursement variables.
Comparing the welfare between the two systems, and proceeding in analogous
way than in the previous case, we can conclude that, there exists a cost of
public funds threshold that deÞnes which reimbursement system leads to higher
welfare. In the same line as in the previous case also here results show that a
(socially) optimal reimbursement policy must trade-o the eects on, not only
public expenditure (in this case higher under a co-payment) but also on agents
surplus. Furthermore, this case raises another crucial consideration that is the
implications of a reimbursement policy on access to care. Indeed, since under
reference pricing the market is only partly covered, even though public expendi-
ture is lower than under a co-payment deÞnitely this system is weaker in terms
of access to care.
8 Conclusions
With the analysis presented we characterized the implications of implementing
a reference pricing policy in comparison to a co-payment system, under dier-
ent market structures. We have been able to show that under a competitive
scenario the relation between prices, quality and market coverage between the
two reimbursement policies depends not only on the relation between the co-
payment rate and the reference price level but also, within the same range of
reimbursement variables, on the instant utility n. The multiplicity of the re-
sults, shows that neither reimbursement policy can be assumed to be always
superior in terms of pharmaceutical expenditure control. Even if drugs prices
are lower under such a policy, this might arise at a high welfare cost if quality
or market coverage vary negatively by the introduction of such a policy. For
asymmetric locations, if Þrms price asymmetrically and set dierent quality lev-
els as the competition tightness between the two reimbursement systems diers
(at least for some market structures), switching from one policy to the other
has signiÞcant inequality implications.
Moreover, still from a cost containment perspective, even when prices are
lowered by the introduction of, for example, reference pricing, if the market
coverage is increased it might be the case that drug expenditure increases. On
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the other hand, if market coverage is lower, the fact that there are consumers
in the market that opt out from buying might increase costs in other types
of treatment by, for instance, increasing the number of doctor visits, hospital
utilization, among others.
These results focus on absolute comparisons between prices, quality and
market coverage for the two reimbursement policies. Nevertheless, for policy
design some further considerations on welfare and agents surplus are useful.
Concerning this matter, even if a policy does lead to lower expenditure in phar-
maceuticals it might do so due to decreased market coverage and/or decreased
quality. This stresses the importance of the mechanism behind the design of re-
imbursement policies. The decision mechanism on drug reimbursement should
better encompass access and minimum quality standards policies, in order to
achieve the desired eects, both from a cost control and welfare perspective.
Within the set-up where the market is exogenously fully covered results are
clear-cut and allow us to derive another important qualitative result. Indeed,
under this scenario, competitive pressure on Þrms is softer in the sense that Þrms
no longer need to compete for consumers at the edges of the market. Under this
structure, the eect of the instant utility n is so overwhelming that the reference
price has no marginal eect. Indeed, we notice that, in this case, the thresholds
deÞning the area where prices and qualities are higher under one of the two
Þnancing schemes, do not depend on the reference price level. In fact, as su is
a lump sum amount, the reimbursement has the same impact on consumers
utility, independently from which Þrm they buy. Furthermore, as the instant
utility n is very high in this case, individuals always choose to buy. Hence the
reference price does not inßuence consumers decision on whether to opt out
from the market. As demand is already at its maximum the reference price has
no impact on it. In fact, equilibrium prices and qualities do not depend on its
level. On the other hand, the co-payment rate  has an impact on competition
between Þrms for consumers located towards the centre, namely for the marginal
consumer }.
We have then shown that the reference pricing is nested in the co-payment
system, i.e., reference pricing system is equivalent, in terms of prices and qual-
ities, to a system where there is no reimbursement. The only role of refer-
ence pricing is acting as "reimbursement ceiling" for the third party payer.
Therefore, contrary to co-payment rate , reference price can not be used as
a regulatory instrument for the determination of prices, qualities or for market
coverage.
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